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Abstract
This article aims to develop a comparative framework of analysis to study urban crises, arguing
that there is a need to establish the analytical links between ‘everyday life and systemic trends
and struggles’, and thus to tie together the insights produced by ‘particularistic accounts’. It exam-
ines urban crises as political phenomena and brings the Marxist notion of ‘alienation’ to the cen-
tre of attention. We argue that ‘alienation’ – as a universal mechanism facilitating capital
accumulation process via dispossession, and as negative mental/emotional implications of dispos-
session, is useful to establish those analytical links. We identify two domains, urban economic
structure and urban political system, where alienation is contained. Public authorities deploy vari-
ous containment strategies in these domains to govern alienation, and urban crises occur when
these strategies fail. The post-2008 wave of urban upheavals could be explained by the failure of
roll-out neoliberal strategies, which constitute the basis of our comparative framework.
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Introduction
Since the global economic crisis of 2008, we
have been witnessing a concurrent wave of
revolutions, occupy movements and violent
mass uprisings across the world. They
erupted in major urban centres and the
demands raised by the protesters have
mostly been urban in nature, about issues
that disrupt the ordinary citizens’ daily life
and/or harm their material/moral well-being
(an urban park in Turkey, bus/metro ticket
price in Brazil, housing debt in Spain, etc.).
This article concentrates on the role and
place of different governance practices of
capitalist states in preparing the grounds for
these protests/movements, and as the
mechanism behind the variation of forms of
contestation. Recent studies on these pro-
tests have revolved around a renewed inter-
est in the notion of urban crisis. We also do
so by problematising ‘urban crisis as a politi-
cal phenomenon’. Responding to Peck’s
(2015) call for comparative theorisation, we
are interested in addressing a central ques-
tion of this special issue: ‘How can we
develop comparative research methodologies
to help understand urban crisis-governance
and its contestation in future research?’.
Given the diversity of forms of protests, par-
ticularistic accounts alone would not help us
much in explaining why these protests/uphea-
vals erupted simultaneously. According to
Davies (2013), a Marxist approach gives us a
clear answer: All these developments have to
do with the fact that ‘capitalism [is] a funda-
mentally crisis-prone socio-economic system’.
This observation suggests that this recent wave
of urban protests/upheavals could well be indi-
cative of a structural disturbance in global
capitalism. The challenge here, however, ‘is to
grasp the relationship between everyday life
and systemic trends and struggles’ (Davies,
2013: 498; also see Kipfer, 2002), and thus what
ties together the insights offered by particularis-
tic and/or case-study based accounts on urban
crisis (Holgersen, 2015: 693–694). We argue
that the Marxist concept of alienation – as a
universal mechanism facilitating capital accu-
mulation process and as a concrete result of
this process characterised by negative mental/
emotional implications for individuals and
societies, could help us in establishing the ana-
lytical links between ‘everyday life and systemic
trends and struggles’, and in tying together the
insights produced by particularistic accounts
around a comparative framework of analysis.
In fact, governments across the globe
have been facing a severe dilemma: to keep
their seats while maintaining the legitimacy
of the capitalist state or to find new venues
for accumulation, adding those sections
of their societies to the ranks of victims
of unfettered exploitation/dispossession,
thereby worsening the alienation problem.
The neoliberal policies adopted by the capi-
talist states across the world have increas-
ingly promoted the second option, which hit
a serious barrier in the global economic cri-
sis of 2008. As Harvey notes, ‘[t]he issue is
not that capital cannot survive its contradic-
tions but that the cost of it so doing becomes
unacceptable to the mass of the population’
(2014: 264). Here the question to further
address is ‘under what conditions and how
the contradictions of capital are translated
into urban crises?’
We argue that urban crises are political
phenomena. They are, and they do erupt at,
moments of political conflict. Thus, they are
political constructs, and are labelled as
‘urban crises’ (by the authorities or by the
society) when public authorities in a given
country lose their grip over the social order,
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and over the geographies constituting/sus-
taining this order; or when public authorities
foresee that a threat to their legitimacy is on
the way. Urban crises have their roots in
contradictions of capitalism (and processes
of capital accumulation) as explained by
Harvey (2014). Of course, urban crises are
mostly triggered by economic crises, which
now mainly hit urban areas/societies. Yet,
the economic crises translate into urban
crises once deepening class tensions and/or
social discontent turn into mobilisations to
threaten established political balances and/
or regimes. In that regard, our focus is on
the political aspects and consequences of
crises of capitalism. We aim to further oper-
ationalise Harvey’s insights on alienation, by
discussing how this universal result of the
contradictions he outlines translate into
urban crises as political phenomena, and
why they take different forms in different
contexts. To better understand urban crises,
we propose to concentrate on the failure of
‘containment strategies’ that used to keep
under check the potential discontent stem-
ming from the effects of alienation generated
by capitalism. In other words, we argue that
urban crises erupt when ‘governance of alie-
nation’ in a given context fails.
We further argue that we could operatio-
nalise alienation for comparative purposes
by bringing the notion of dispossession to
the centre of analysis. Especially when we
are to explain the geographical logic of
variation in the forms of urban crises, ‘dis-
possession as the essence of alienation’
could be quite helpful. In particular, it
could help us understand how the costs of
capital accumulation are fixed onto certain
geographies and classes/social groups, by
asking questions about (a) how the pro-
cesses of neoliberal urbanisation facilitate
this cost transfer, while linking different
parts of capitalism’s geography (urban ver-
sus non-urban; West/North versus East/
South), (b) and thus what forms of
alienation are produced, through spatial
dynamics of capital accumulation. In that
regard, we could also begin to investigate
the geographically established causal links
between different instances of urban crises
across the world.
Governance of alienation:
Containment strategies
In this section, to further develop our argu-
ment that ‘urban crises erupt when ‘‘govern-
ance of alienation’’ in a given context fails’
we will first discuss alienation as a mechan-
ism that prepare the grounds for political
discontent. Then, we will identify two
domains where the negative consequences of
alienation could be contained: ‘(urban) eco-
nomic structure’ and ‘(urban) political sys-
tem’. Then, departing from this analytical
distinction, we will offer a categorisation of
containment strategies deployed by public
authorities, as instruments of governance of
alienation.
Alienation
To reiterate, broadly speaking, alienation
could be defined as a universal mechanism
facilitating capital accumulation process and
as a concrete result of this process charac-
terised by negative mental/emotional impli-
cations for individuals and societies. To
further develop our discussion, we will first
borrow the following definition(s) formu-
lated by Harvey (2014: 267, emphases
added):
As a legal term it means to transfer a property
right to the ownership of another . As a
social relation it refers to how affections, loyal-
ties and trust can be alienated (transferred,
stolen away) from one person, institution or
political cause to another. [It refers to] (loss)
of trust (in persons or institutions such as the
law, the banks, the political system) . As a
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passive psychological term alienation means to
become isolated and estranged from some val-
ued connectivity . experienced and interna-
lized as a feeling of sorrow and grief at some
undefinable loss that cannot be recuperated.
As an active psychological state it means to be
angry and hostile at being or feeling
oppressed, deprived or dispossessed and to act
out that anger and hostility, lashing out some-
time without any clear definitive reason or
rational target, against the world in general.
The first definition is of utmost importance
in that it is about the logic of the capital
accumulation process, while the rest refers
to the implications of this process for the
individual and the society. We will come
back to the rest, especially the last two, in
the concluding section. Below, we further
elaborate on the implications of the first
definition.
Through a careful exegesis of Marx’s var-
ious works, Ollman (1971) brings the capi-
talist production process to the centre of
analysis in his account of alienation. In this
process, the relationship between capital and
the worker is established via the transfer of
ownership of the latter’s labour power to
capital. This capitalist process commodifies
labour and human needs and ultimately
human becomes alienated to her/his produc-
tive activity and start to feel himself/herself
as the ‘extensions of commodities’ (Marcuse,
1964). This alienation process runs as a
vicious circle to the degree of enslaving the
worker, and thus leads to the total integra-
tion of the working class into the capitalist
system (Marcuse, 1964; Ollman, 1971).
Dispossession of labour power is the core of
this process and it is an enforced one rather
than a free legal exchange between two
equal parties.
Pointing the finger at accumulation by
dispossession, Harvey’s generic definition
expands the implications of the analysis
above. Capitalist production is not the sole/
major venue of capital accumulation any
longer. Along with further commodification
of labour power, there are now new venues/
forms of dispossession in the neoliberal/glo-
bal context of capitalism, which are mostly
operationalised through neoliberal urban poli-
cies such as commodification of (urban) land
(leading to expulsion of urban/rural popula-
tions from their habitat), privatisation/com-
modification of public assets (including
natural resources and land, public services
and institutions), conversion of property
rights, the national debt and the use of the
credit system (financialisation as a means of
long-term dispossession of labour and land),
suppression of indigenous forms of produc-
tion, and monetisation of exchange, etc. (cf.
Harvey, 2005).
What happens when the alienation pro-
cess described by Ollman and Marcuse is
expanded as Harvey explains? To elaborate
our answer to this question, we shall borrow
the following quote from Marx’s 1844
Manuscripts about the enslavement of
labour: ‘The worker therefore only feels
himself outside his work, and in his work
feels outside himself. He is at home when he
is not working, and when he is working he is
not at home’ (Marx, 1959: 72). A corollary
of this insight is that non-work-related
domains of life (family, friendships, cultural
activities, hobbies, civic/community activi-
ties, etc.), which are experienced in living
spaces (homes and public spaces such as
streets, neighbourhoods, parks, squares,
theatres, etc.), do emerge as venues where
the negative effects of alienation originating
from the workplace might be relieved and
could be contained. The containment strate-
gies enter the picture here.
Domains and strategies of containment
Governance of alienation would require,
first, to devise policies/strategies to buffer
consequences of ‘alienation at the work-
place’ via introduction of a ‘life support
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system’, which we call (urban) economic
structure, based on public spending on wel-
fare, social security systems, workplace stan-
dards, regulation of finance capital, etc. .
Yet, these policies alone would not be help-
ful to govern alienation. There is a second
and even more strategic venue of governance
of alienation, urban political system,
explained below.
Policies geared towards protection of liv-
ing spaces, where the negative implications
of alienation at the workplace could be con-
tained more easily, need to be introduced.
These could involve introducing limits to
commodification of housing (cheap/public
housing, protection of tenants, etc.), (urban)
land, publicly owned assets/commons and
transportation, for example; as well as poli-
cies to protect/revive social capital (broadly
understood). Given that the policies
designed to contain alienation at the work-
place are more jealously protected by the
capitalist state, and have been carefully de-
politicised over decades, the non-work-
related domains of life emerge as the natural
venue of expression of discontent stemming
from alienation (at work). Thus, they could
be more easily politicised; and urban poli-
tics, which revolve around urban policies of
national governments as well as the policies
pursued by local governments, emerge as a
critical venue of expression and containment
of discontent. Then, urban political systems,
consisting of (a) institutional design of/con-
ducting ‘politics of representation’ and (b)
production of ‘(political) culture and dis-
course’ to promote/contest public authority,
serve as a major venue of governance of
alienation.
No doubt, neoliberal policies have been
deepening alienation at the workplace. And
during its roll-back stage, the life support
system was unplugged in a hurry, worsening
the alienation problem and resulting in pro-
tests in different countries. It was to be
restored, albeit partially, during the roll-out
phase. As we will discuss in the following
section, that phase reached its limits too.
But below, we will first list and discuss the
roll-out containment strategies deployed to
govern alienation in the domain economic
structure, which ultimately turned it into an
‘urban economic structure’. We could iden-
tify two main strategies:
(A) ‘(Re)Distribution of wealth via public
policies’ to contain the tensions created by
the roll-back damage done to the classical
life support system (national/local economic
structure, the welfare state), which involves
restoring social spending. There are two
sub-strategies here. First, to contain deepen-
ing proleterianisation and precarisation of
working classes, selectively inclusive state
policies, such as roll-out welfare policies were
introduced (Davies, 2011, 2012, 2014; Peck,
2012; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Given the
shortage of available public resources, this
selectivity was necessary. In cases such as
Turkey, where the neoliberal urbanisation
process has increasingly widened the income
gaps, this selectivity worked to keep the soci-
ety politically divided, too (Bayırbag˘, 2013;
Bayırbag˘ and Penpeciog˘lu, 2014). Second,
alternative sources to fund public policies had
to be generated to make up for the commo-
dification of the commons, public resources
and services. Those involved the sale of pub-
lic assets/institutions that are not directly
involved in service provision, parallel bud-
geting and charity-based service provision,
etc. (Bug˘ra and Candasx, 2011; also see
Bug˘ra, 1998).
(B) ‘Ensuring sustainability of neoliberal
urbanisation’ to contain the tensions created
by expansion of dispossession process, tar-
geting (urban) land/housing in particular.
We could identify two sub-strategies here,
too. First, to contain mass resistance to
commodification and dispossession of urban
land and public spaces, informalisation of
private property and selective distribution of
urban rents (Kuyucu and U¨nsal, 2010; Peck
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et al., 2013; Penpeciog˘lu, 2013; Sxengu¨l, 2013;
Swyngedouw et al., 2002) have been
deployed as effective strategies (see section
‘Limits to containment strategies: Roots of
urban crises’ for detailed discussion). Second
sub-strategy was to encourage/invite global
financial capital to invest into urbanisation
(see Smith, 2002). Given its destructive con-
sequences, as proven after the 2008 crisis,
this policy orientation might not sound to
be a reasonable containment strategy on the
part of the public authorities. But it was,
until 2008. In the West/North, it has helped
to bring the middle classes under political
control via long-term indebtedness to the
banks. The stick called economic stability
has promoted the political status quo (of
course till the housing bubble burst). That
scheme also worked in the East/South, too.
What is more, global financial capital origi-
nating from the West/North found new
venues of accumulation in the East/South,
also thanks to the neoliberal urbanisation
policies implemented in the latter countries.
This was to the benefit of the public authori-
ties on both sides. In the Western/Northern
countries, domestic limits to accumulation
were overcome to a certain degree, thereby
relieving the pressure on different domains
of alienation there. In the Eastern/Southern
countries, the public authorities have been
provided with capital needed to initiate a
(virtual) growth strategy without having to
tap into the public purse (cf. Karaman,
2012).
As for the roll-out containment strategies
deployed to govern alienation in the domain
urban political system, we could identify,
again, two main strategies:
(C) ‘Redesigning politics of representation’ to
contain the increasing tensions created by
alienation of masses from the policy-making
process informed by a neoliberal agenda.
First sub-strategy, promoting local democracy,
participation and entrepreneurialism aimed to
contain the discontent created by policies
facilitating the expansion of dispossession to
the non-work-related domains of life (Amin
and Thrift, 1995; Harvey, 1989; MacLeod,
2001; MacLeod and Jones, 2007; Purcell,
2006). This sub-strategy had to be backed by
a second one, social capital engineering
(Kurtog˘lu, 2004; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001;
Putnam, 1993). There are two aims here: to
incorporate communal ties (family, kinship,
religious and ethnicity-based networks) into
the urban economic structure so as to contain
the alienation created at the workplace; and
to turn informal social networks (especially
religious and ethnicity-based) into relatively
safe channels of political representation. This
strategy also propagates identity politics,
which, in turn, serves to keep the masses
(working classes) politically divided
(Bayırbag˘, 2013).
(D) ‘Promoting hyper-urbanism’1 to contain
discontent that could stem from disposses-
sion of the public via commodification/pri-
vatisation of public spaces/commons and
concentration of public and private capital
into major cities/urban centres to the detri-
ment of relatively underdeveloped neigh-
bourhoods/cities/regions. First sub-strategy
deployed, in that regard, is to promote consu-
merism in cities by city branding, place mar-
keting, etc. Here, individualism is to be
sanctified to the effect of hollowing out the
meaning of public. This cultural intervention
serves to keep citizens disinterested in collec-
tive ideals and politics (Goldman, 2011; Hall
and Hubbard, 1998; Roy, 2011; Urry, 1995;
McCann and Ward, 2012), thereby weaken-
ing the ideological bases likely to generate
organised discontent. Second sub-strategy
too, serves to rescale the politics of neoliber-
alism. Promoting a globalist policy discourse
on national development which champions glo-
bal cities (cf. Brenner, 2004; Keyder, 2000;
Sassen, 2001; Taylor, 1999 – world system
approach) serves to justify concentration of
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private and public investments into major
cities, while creating an expectation on the
part of broader public that the economic
growth in those cities will create a spill-over
effect in the long term.
Given the universal nature of the main
problem these strategies are addressing, alie-
nation via dispossession, the strategies listed
above have been deployed extensively (albeit
in different combinations) across the geogra-
phy of capitalism during the neoliberal era.
Yet, they reached their limits.
Limits to containment strategies:
Roots of urban crises
Neoliberalism resembles the Ouroboros, the
snake eating itself. The content of the roll-
out containment strategies outlined above
indicates that neoliberalism’s response to the
problems it creates is to further deepen and
widen itself (Aalbers, 2013: 1085; also see
Peck, 2012: 651). Yet, the post-2008 wave of
urban uprisings suggests that, unlike the
Ouroboros, it is not eternal. Roll-out con-
tainment strategies seem to have reached
their limits. It looks as if the urban uprisings
will not subside anytime soon.
In fact, as the roll-out containment strate-
gies were being deployed, the social and geo-
graphical scope of dispossession/
accumulation continued to expand, too.
What places and who were the new targets?
The answer was: The very centres of wealth,
metropolitan cities and those sections of
society/classes with possessions, inhabiting
those urban centres of wealth. This
amounted to directly targeting ‘private prop-
erty’ (land property), as well as local com-
mons (cf. Aalbers, 2013: 1084); and
proleterianisation of the white collar middle
classes (Boratav, 2013). These interventions
have had a direct impact on the daily lives
of the population: Loss of jobs, flexibilisa-
tion and precarisation of work, increased
periods of unemployment and social insecur-
ity (coupled with the increasing decay of sol-
idarity networks, thereby paralysing social
capital engineering efforts), commodifica-
tion of commons (public spaces, agricultural
areas, forests, water resources . etc.). The
need to further deepen the dispossession
process would amount to paralyse, or give
up on, a set of containment strategies listed
above, namely ‘selectively inclusive state pol-
icies, such as roll-out welfare policies’ by giv-
ing up on an already vague emphasis on
inclusiveness; ‘promoting a globalist policy
discourse on national development cham-
pioning global cities’, by increasingly
restricting the benefits of this policy to a
narrower set of social groups/classes even in
those global cities; and ‘promoting local
democracy, participation and entrepreneuri-
alism’, because of the need to embrace an
increasingly authoritarian policy outlook to
be able to implement such harsh measures
devastating peoples’ lives. This could be
likened to the Ouroboros’ move to eat its
own tail to regenerate itself.
This expansion process proved to be
much more explosive as they added a better
organised and politically more conscious
middle class to the ranks of the victims of
dispossession (cf. Bayat, 2007); while also
attacking the very principle of private prop-
erty, which constitutes one of the founda-
tions of the discourse of freedom and
democracy in capitalist societies. Given that
this principle has played a key role in estab-
lishing the political ties between the bour-
geois democracy and the middle classes
especially, attacking ‘private property’
would result in ‘alienating’ the middle
classes from the bourgeois politics. The ‘alie-
nation’ problem portrayed here is now turn-
ing into an existential crisis (cf. Bayat, 2000)
for a substantial section of urban societies
(cf. Yiftachel, 2009, in McFarlane, 2012; cf.
Peck, 2012: 650–651). This existential crisis
is inevitable as promotion of individualism
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(see ‘Promoting hyper-urbanism’, (D)
above) serves to deepen the alienation as a
passive psychological state, harming the val-
ued social connectivities (despite the social
capital engineering efforts). In this context,
the belief in the virtues of bourgeois democ-
racy and the promises of wealth by capital-
ism (and free market economy) remain as
the only source of hope, especially for the
middle classes. Once the principle of private
property, the ideological basis of this hope,
is attacked, and once the bourgeois democ-
racy reaches its limits of delivering this hope,
that passive psychological state could
quickly translate into the active, agressive,
psychological state Harvey (2014) refers to.
Apparently, continuation of an expanded
dispossession process, especially when you
are to take on private property and labour of
a politically conscious and better organised
section of society, could become only possi-
ble by also disturbing the urban political sys-
tem, i.e. (a) giving up on the promoting
(local) democracy discourse; (b) building up
an increasingly authoritarian police state (cf.
Sxengu¨l, 2013); (c) bringing an end to the
principle of ‘rule of law’ via selective employ-
ment of a more flexible/nebulous legal
framework to legitimise unjust practices of
neoliberal urbanisation (Bayırbag˘ and
Penpeciog˘lu, 2014; Kuyucu, 2013a, 2013b;
for a detailed case study see Yılmaz, 2011).
Degree of flexibility of the political regime
in a given country will determine the form
an urban crisis takes. The portfolio of con-
tainment strategies available to the policy-
makers in different countries and their
capacity to make up for the failure of certain
strategies by operationalising yet others
underlie this flexibility; and differences
between the forms of urban crises emerging
in the West/North and in the East/South
could be explained by these factors. As we
will discuss in detail later, the Western/
Northern countries have a richer portfolio of
political containment strategies that might
render potential discontent more manage-
able. For example, by diverting public’s
attention to local governments via austerity
urbanism, the problem might be reduced to
a purely local democracy problem (cf. Peck,
2012: 650–651). In that regard, Purcell’s
(2006) caution that ‘the right to the city’ dis-
course could fall into the ‘local trap’ becomes
meaningful in that it could miss the roots of
the crisis of urban governance in the domi-
nant accumulation regime. And national
policy-makers could also avoid the political
costs of urban crisis, while enjoying the
opportunity to put the blame on the inepti-
tude and incompetence of ‘over-responsibi-
lised’ city elites (cf. Peck et al., 2013: 1097).
Besides, as the home base of global capi-
tal, the Western/Northern countries still
enjoy the relative advantage of exporting
their own troublemakers to the East/South
(as discussed under the strategy ‘to encour-
age/invite global financial capital to invest
into urbanisation’ (see (B) above), which, to
reiterate, could eventually solve domestic
limits to accumulation, thereby relieving the
pressure on different domains of alienation
there. Yet, the long-term prospects of success
of this strategy (on the part of the Western/
Eastern countries) are quite dim now. This
has to do with the fact that containment
strategies of the Eastern/Southern countries
reached their limits.
In fact, unlike past country-/continent-spe-
cific urban revolts, the geographical reach of
those revolts has been stunning (from Brasil
to Egypt to Hong Kong). This time urban
protests cut across the North/South divide.
In fact, what makes this recent round more
widespread and even more striking is that
the South came to the fore and the major
urban centres of the South took the lead.2
Especially in these cases, the protests have
been more violent and regime-threatening,
and urban crises, as we shall discuss later in
detail, have mainly been crises of urban polit-
ical system.
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In the Eastern/Southern countries, urban
economic structure has relied more on the
strategy ‘ensuring sustainability of neoliberal
urbanisation’ than ‘(re)distribution of wealth
via public policies’. Given the chronic prob-
lems of the public purse in those countries,
that was inevitable. Yet, this has been a pretty
risky bet as the neoliberal urbanisation poli-
cies in those countries have increased the pace
of urbanisation there, turning the Eastern/
Southern metropolitan cities into hotbeds of
stark contrasts/inequalities. This has, to bor-
row Ollman’s terminology, worsened aliena-
tion of masses in terms of ‘Man’s [sic] relation
to his fellow men [sic]’ (1971: chapter 21) and
‘Man’s [sic] relation to his species’ (1971:
chapter 22), especially the latter culminating
in the inhumane conditions of urban poor in
such cities. To repeat Harvey’s point, ‘[t]he
issue is not that capital cannot survive its con-
tradictions but that the cost of it so doing
becomes unacceptable to the mass of the pop-
ulation’ (2014: 264). This is precisely the case
with the Eastern/Southern cases. There, the
former strategy, which would work more
effectively once complemented by the latter,
has served to deepen the problems to be
addressed by the latter. Besides, speeding up
the neoliberal urbanisation process consumes
scarce public resources at a faster pace, and in
bigger amounts, to the effect of destroying
the capacity to initiate wealth (re)distribution
programs, which could otherwise serve as a
buffer mechanism, ensuring the sustainability
of that former strategy.
A closer look at those cases suggests the
presence of a rather universal scheme of dis-
possession, which has been run on a pretty
thin urban political system, with similar dis-
possession tactics across continents. In the
case of China, for example, Fu (2002) indi-
cates how the state uses land lease as a
mechanism to dispossess public land and
allow it for the development of construction
and finance sectors to make Shanghai a glo-
bal city. Like Shanghai, in Taipei neoliberal
urbanism facilitates and attracts investments
through large-scale urban projects. As Jou
et al. (2011) highlight, land acquisition via
the privatisation of public land has played a
key role in dispossession and four large-scale
urban projects in Taipei were formed and
implemented in that regard. In this East
Asian way of neoliberal urbanism, there has
been a consensus among central state, local
state and private capital over establishing
private property on public land (Jou et al.,
2011). In Mumbai there has been an enor-
mous urban regeneration operation displa-
cing millions of slum dwellers. In Bangalore
land speculation and dispossession of the
people living in city’s rural periphery has
become the market-driven priority to make
it a world city (Goldman, 2011; Roy, 2009).
Neoliberal urbanism and its variegated
practices of dispossession not only came to
dominate urban policy in Asian countries;
but they have also constituted the main
motive behind the reproduction of urban
space in Latin American countries. These
neoliberal policies of dispossession correlate
with changes in increased unemployment
and informality, poverty and inequality,
crime, victimisation and urban insecurity
(Portez and Roberts, 2005). In certain Latin
American cities, urban gentrification has
become a state-led strategy for social dispos-
session of land (for the case of Chile see:
Lopez-Morales, 2010). In others, these
changes have exacerbated urban socio-
spatial segregation and brought in intract-
able problems for capitalism, those about
citizenship, human rights and democracy
(for the case of Brazil see: Caldeira, 2001).
Turkey has been the leading example
from the Middle East. In the Turkish story
of neoliberalisation, accumulation has heav-
ily relied on urbanisation of capital, dramati-
cally altering the socio-spatial fabric of the
cities, while increasingly rendering class and
socio-spatial inequalities in the cities perma-
nent (Sxengu¨l, 2009 [2001], 2012). In this
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process, the built and non-built environ-
ment, public resources and land, historically
and culturally valuable sites, squatter areas
have all come to be subordinated to the logic
of urban rent (Sxengu¨l, 2013). As Balaban
(2012) points out, the state has played a lead-
ing role in the growth of the construction
sector in Turkish cities and facilitated the
dispossession process via various legislations
reorganising planning powers, transferring
property rights and empowering central gov-
ernment institutions as the leading actor
(also see Penpeciog˘lu, 2013). This process
has been associated with further centralisa-
tion of decision-making powers at all levels
of public institutions (Sxengu¨l, 2012). In the
context of such an authoritarian policy
regime, urban regeneration projects enact
‘forced marketisation’ (Aalbers, 2013;
Kuyucu and U¨nsal, 2010) that intensifies the
displacement and dispossession of the urban
poor (see, for example, Danısxan, 2012; and
Poyraz, 2011), while subordinating a broader
segment of the society, mainly the middle
class, to the financialisation of the housing
market and rendering their labour captive to
finance capital (Akcxay, 2015; Karaman,
2012).
In the Eastern/Southern examples, we
witness implementation of a reverse and loud
encroachment policy (cf. Bayat, 2000) pur-
sued by the state, speeding up the disposses-
sion process while deepening existing
inequalities, and yet creating new ones
(Kuyucu, 2013a: 609–612, 618, 624;
McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2011; also see
Kuyucu, 2013b). In such countries, as noted,
prospects for containing the emergent crises
via state reforms are rather dim as the poli-
tics of representation are not constructed on
the basis of the idea of formal citizenship
but rather on the basis of clientelism (cf.
Bayat and Biekart, 2009: 819–820, 824; also
see Kuyucu, 2013a: 12), and the contain-
ment capacity of clientelism reaches its limits
when the public authorities have no more
rent to distribute in the face of a global eco-
nomic crisis, which paralyses neoliberal
urbanisation policies there. Hence, it should
come as no surprise that urban crises in the
East/West tend to take more violent forms.
Forms of urban crises: A
comparative framework
As argued, urban crises come in different
forms, depending on the types of strategies
failed in different contexts. In fact, to explore
how/when/which containment strategies are
operationalised, in what combinations, and
how/when/why they succeed or fail in a
given context is an empirical task (so, the
examples given Table 1 below are tentative,
to provoke further thinking on our frame-
work). Our task here, however, is an analyti-
cal one. By offering a categorisation of
urban crises on the basis of containment
strategies, we aim to construct an analytical
framework that could help us formulate fur-
ther research questions for comparison.
In section ‘Governance of alienation:
Containment strategies’, we have identified
two domains where the negative conse-
quences of alienation could be contained:
‘(urban) economic structure’ and ‘(urban)
political system’. We think that we could
develop our comparative framework on that
basis, too, with three major categories at
hand: (a) Failure in/of urban economic
structure; (b) failure in/of urban political
system; (c) total failure (when the former
categories overlap) (Table 1). That categori-
sation could be further developed on the
basis of major containment categories, such
as category one only, category two only or
both etc.
Of course, we do not argue that sub-
categories separately listed under urban eco-
nomic structure and urban political system
are not interrelated. Our point is that these
two domains have different functions in con-
taining alienation via dispossession. While
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the urban economic structure mainly offers
compensation for the material losses caused
by alienation, the urban political system
recuperates the mental/emotional losses (cf.
Harvey, 2014: 267). Hence, the crises falling
into the latter category could be expected to
be more explosive. This is inevitable as the
urban political system serves as the last
resort for the political regimes to keep the
effects of alienation under control.
Following the above line of reasoning we
further argue that if urban economic struc-
ture fails, we should expect to see increasing
pressure on urban political system. There,
flexibility of the political regime in a given
country gains significance. The capacity of
public authorities to tolerate further demo-
cratisation to maintain their own legitimacy
and/or their capacity to manipulate the polit-
ical discourses/identities shaping the bases/
faultlines of nationhood, i.e. ability to rede-
sign politics of representation (C); and ability
to formulate a brand new discourse of devel-
opment (as an alternative hyper-urbanism)
(D) are critical. Here, an important axis of
comparison between the Western/Northern
and Eastern/Southern cases is the degree of
this flexibility.
If the regime is flexible, we could see an
urban crisis thus emerging (in/of urban eco-
nomic structure) be contained by the public
authorities via shifting the emphasis on the
domain of containment from urban eco-
nomic structure to urban political system.
Yet, this would be a temporary solution
unless future changes are made to the urban
economic structure. Otherwise, we could
expect urban political system to fail after a
while, and witness that urban crisis to take a
new, and more violent, form. This is, for
example, the major challenge before the
SYRIZA in Greece and PODEMOS in
Spain, which have temporarily contained the
discontent of the masses via democratic
change, thanks to the flexibility of the urban
political systems in their respective coun-
tries. Besides, the case of SYRIZA indicates
that political/policy paralysis is an inevitable
result once the policy-makers are caught
between the neoliberal pressures on urban
economic structure and progressive pres-
sures on the urban political system, which
increasingly consumes the portfolio of con-
tainment strategies available to them.
If the urban economic structure in a given
context is already a fragile one, for example
Table 1. Different forms of urban crisis (and some recent instances of urban uprisings suggesting the
presence of an urban crisis).
The failure of urban economic
structure
The failure of urban political
system
Total failure
(A) ‘(Re)Distribution of wealth
via public policies’ fails
(C) ‘Redesigning politics of
representation’ fails
(A+B) + (C+D) fail
(Brazil, June–July 2013) (Ferguson 2014, Baltimore
2015)
(Egypt, Tahrir Resistance
+ and the Coup in 2013)
(B) ‘Ensuring sustainability of
neoliberal urbanisation’ fails
(D) ‘Promoting hyper-urbanism’
fails
(Spain) (India – Struggles/protests
against
large-scale urban projects)
Both (A) and (B) fail Both (C) and (D) fail
(Greece) (Turkey, Gezi Protests in
June–July 2013)
(USA Occupy Movement)
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without effective public policies redistribut-
ing wealth (A), and mainly depends on neo-
liberal urbanisation policies (B), then failure
of the latter strategy is likely to spark more
destructive events. As the pressure will be
mainly on the urban political system. In fact,
this latter strategy (B) is more directly vul-
nerable to a global financial crisis. Given the
significance of neoliberal urbanisation as a
national development strategy (by attracting
global capital) in many Eastern/Southern
countries, failure of that strategy upon a glo-
bal financial crisis will inevitably increase the
likelihood of urban crisis in the domain of
urban political system. Yet, whether or not
this pressure will result in a crisis will depend
upon the degree of flexibility of the political
regime, as noted.
Of course, urban crises could directly
emerge in the domain urban political system,
while there is a relatively more effective
urban economic structure established on the
basis of a successful blend of related contain-
ment strategies. Especially if the success of
the urban economic structure depends on a
rather authoritarian style of policy-making,
this increasingly renders containment strate-
gies in urban political system ineffective.
That was the case with the Gezi Protests of
2013 in Turkey. The Erdog˘an government
was able to contain that uprising in politi-
cal terms, temporarily, as indicated by their
success in local elections of 2014 (Bayırbag˘
and Penpeciog˘lu, 2014). In fact, his govern-
ment’s promises were mainly about further
deepening the strategy ‘ensuring sustainabil-
ity of neoliberal urbanisation’ (B). Yet,
given the vulnerability of this strategy to
global economic instability, and given the
fact that this strategy has also supported
the strategy (A) ‘redistribution of wealth’,
collapse of the urban economic structure in
Turkey could well result in Total Failure, as
in the case of Egypt. Current political ten-
sions in Turkey are alarming, in this
regard.
Conclusion
Understanding urban crisis is not an easy
task, because: (a) although root causes
develop over an extended time-period, they
become visible and/or are labelled as crises at
points of political upheaval/conflict; (b) crises
are moments of confusion, when everything
we thought we knew about ourselves, our
own societies and/or countries might be pro-
ven wrong, while theoretical opportunities to
make sense of the events leading to crisis are
consumed; (c) crises themselves ignite diverse
and dispersed social/economic/political reac-
tions displaying various spatio-temporal pat-
terns; (d) the fact that crises become visible at
certain places and at a certain point in time
might lead us to focus our attention on that
particular place and time/era in history,
thereby leading us to miss the bigger picture;
(e) measures taken by public authorities to
do away with crises are hasty, partial and
pragmatic in nature. Thus, researchers might
have a hard time in detecting meaningful pat-
terns in their intervention schemes. Hence,
the multifaceted, comprehensive and politi-
cally contentious nature of urban crises tends
to render our attempts to make sense of this
phenomenon particularistic and limited in
nature.
We are equipped with analytical tools nec-
essary to build a comprehensive/comparative
account of urban crises, which remains sensi-
tive to spatio-temporal particularities. This is
possible because the phenomenon of urban
crisis is deeply rooted in contradictions of
‘capital accumulation’ (cf. Harvey, 2014),
and thus capitalism as the major political-
economic code of conduct pervading the
globe, weaving human society into a single,
yet shaky, fragile and contradictory totality
(cf. Brenner, 2013). In that regard, we argued
that the Marxist concept of ‘alienation’ – as
a universal mechanism facilitating capital
accumulation process via dispossession, and
as negative mental/emotional implications of
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dispossession finding their unique expres-
sions in the non-work-related domains of
life, will be useful in establishing the analyti-
cal links between ‘everyday life and systemic
trends and struggles’, and in tying together
the insights produced by ‘particularistic
accounts’ around a comparative framework
of analysis. Our aim, in that regard, was to
take Harvey’s insights on alienation one step
further, by explaining how this universal
result of the contradictions he outlines trans-
late into urban crises as political phenomena,
and why they take different forms in differ-
ent contexts.
To further operationalise this perspective,
we identified two domains, urban economic
structure and urban political system, where
the mental/emotional and material impacts
of alienation could be contained. We argued
that public authorities do develop different
containment strategies in these domains to
govern alienation, and that urban crises
occur when these containment strategies fail.
Those strategies constitute the basis of our
comparative framework.
In the above regards, we claimed that the
post-2008 global wave of urban protests
could be seen as the evidence of a deeper
current of urban crises, caused by the failure
of ‘roll-out neoliberal containment’ strate-
gies. Neoliberal urbanisation policies widely
implemented across the world could be seen
as an important factor that geographically
ties together different urban crises across the
world. The logic of geographical variation is
determined by the unique configuration of
urban economic structures and urban politi-
cal systems, as well as the degree of flexibil-
ity of the political regimes in their respective
contexts. This line of reasoning could help
us explain the differences between the urban
crises occurring in the Western/Northern
and the Eastern/Southern countries, broadly
speaking. While the former crises are rather
products of failure of urban economic struc-
ture, the latter tend to erupt in the domain
of urban political system, where mental/
emotional effects of alienation are contained,
and thus are more explosive.
That the Eastern/Southern countries took
the lead in this new wave of urban protests,
unlike the past experience, should come as
no surprise in that roll-out neoliberalism has
taken its heaviest tolls there, and unlike the
Western/Northern countries, they do not
possess that much political flexibility needed
to govern alienation. What is more, it should
be remembered that while the Western/
Northern urban crises could be kept under
check for a while, that success will be short-
lived. This is mostly because political con-
testation in the East/South has a capacity to
paralyse the urban economic structure in the
West/North and to increase the pressure on
the urban political systems there.
The last two connotations of the term
alienation given by Harvey (2014), namely
as a ‘passive psychological state’ and as an
‘active psychological state’ should be further
examined if we are to further elaborate our
analysis of urban crises, and especially its
‘contestation’ side. To quote Harvey, again,
as an active psychological state ‘it means to
be angry and hostile at being or feeling
oppressed, deprived or dispossessed and to
act out that anger and hostility, lashing out
sometime without any clear definitive reason
or rational target, against the world in gen-
eral’ (2014: 267, emphasis added). The major
challenge before any political/social move-
ment to challenge capitalism, then, is to
make sure that this ‘passive state’ will not be
captive to this ‘active state’, where revolu-
tionary energies are easily lost, while giving
a perfect excuse to the oppressors to crimi-
nalise the opposition. In other words, the
opposition should formulate a definitive rea-
son, to end alienation, and a rational target,
the containment strategies of the oppressors.
The ‘right to the city’ discourse does only
half of the job. The real challenge, then, is to
establish the discursive and political links
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between the struggles at the workplace and
at the non-work related domains of life.
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Notes
1. The term ‘hyper-urbanism’, as used here,
refers to a policy orientation/discourse which
aims to transform cities by better articulat-
ing/integrating them with global (economic/
cultural) networks, while promoting a self-
indulgent urban culture adorned with gran-
deur and extremes (see Hogan and Potter,
2014; McCann et al, 2013; Roy, 2011).
2. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the
literature on urban crisis, except for those
covering the cases from the USA and the UK
(and partly Europe), has not been that rich.
What is more, unlike past instances of urban
crises of the USA (and Europe), the urban
revolts/protests in the South have been threa-
tening their respective political regimes/gov-
ernments (see the examples of Egypt, Turkey,
Spain and Greece). Thus, it is not easy to
argue that these revolts/protests totally stand
as chances to further rationalise capitalism,
or ‘crisis as an opportunity’, on the part of
the policy-makers, at least in the South.
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